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The New Handshake: Where We Are Now*
Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule**
Abstract
The internet has empowered consumers in new and exciting ways. It has opened
more efficient avenues for consumers to buy just about anything. Want proof? Just
pull out your smartphone, swipe your finger across the screen a few times, and
presto – your collector’s edition Notorious RBG bobblehead is on its way from
China. Unfortunately, however, the internet has not yet delivered on its promise to
improve consumer protection.
Keywords: consumers, consumer protection, online dispute resolution (ODR),
remedies, e-commerce.
At the dawn of the internet age many futurists predicted that technology would
shift the balance of power between consumers and merchants in favour of con‐
sumers. In his seminal book The Cluetrain Manifesto (written in 1999 with Rick
Levine, David Weinberger and Christopher Locke), Doc Searls predicted that tech‐
nology would usher in a golden age of consumer choice, where buyers would use
the wide range of options provided to them by frictionless e-commerce to play
merchants off of each other, ensuring that consumers got the best deals and the
widest selection in every online exchange.
But that vision is still a work in progress. In some respects the internet has
achieved the opposite, ushering in a new age of consumer confusion and disem‐
powerment. Consumers do have access to more information than they did in the
past, but many buyers still have a hard time making sense of it to figure out
which merchants are the most trustworthy. It is also still too hard for consumers
to learn how to resolve transaction problems when they arise. Some merchants
and marketplaces have leveraged the wide-open, wild-west nature of the internet
to sow even more fear, uncertainty and doubt among consumers, further prevent‐
ing them from holding bad merchants accountable. A new breed of fraudster has
emerged as well, savvy in the ways of the internet and skilled at covering their
online tracks. In retrospect, the new reach and choice provided by the internet
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have unquestionably expanded purchasing options for consumers, but utopian
predictions about a golden age of consumer empowerment remain unrealized.
Almost every industry has been reinvented by the expansion of information
and communications technology, from medicine to finance to entertainment. But
the redress processes made available to most consumers have not evolved in a
similar way. Most resolution options available to consumers resemble those avail‐
able decades ago: a 1-800 number, a complaint form, or an unsatisfying online
chat process. For most consumers in the modern era, none of those options
sounds very appealing. At the same time, small claims court is often unavailable
or unsatisfactory for many claims due to jurisdictional limits, long time frames
and other complexities.
1

Making It Tough for Consumers to Get Solutions

How long were you on hold last time you tried to call customer service regarding a
complaint? Hold times are getting longer, sometimes as long as an hour. Indeed,
reaching a live representative is increasingly difficult. It is therefore no surprise
that consumers lament the lack of meaningful access to customer assistance with
respect to their purchases.
Companies also may restrict remedies knowing that most consumers are
unlikely to read their contracts, let alone understand what the contracts really
say. Studies have shown that most consumers ignore contract terms when signing
up for a site or service, even when the website requires concrete action such as
clicking a link on a website or scrolling through the terms all the way to the end.
Contract terms in e-contracts also may be confusing. They are filled with legalese,
and often obscured by online ‘pop-ups’ and other shrouding techniques. It would
take enormous patience and intelligence to read and understand the terms in
many common contracts.
At the same time, consumers often assume that they will not really be
required to abide by the terms of their contracts. For example, they may figure
that companies will be honourable and provide remedies if anything goes wrong,
regardless of ‘fine print’ exclusions in the warranty. Consumers also may suffer
from over-optimism, cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias with respect to
their purchases. At the time of purchase, most consumers optimistically presume
there won’t be a problem, so they don’t worry about terms or eventual remedies
when they click the accept box to complete a purchase. Likewise, they want to
believe that they made wise purchases, to avoid any dissonance. This also means
that when problems do arise, consumers often ignore the problem in hopes of
confirming their wisdom.
Most consumers also suffer from inertia when they sign up for new websites,
which prevents them from proactively reading or seeking to change contract
terms before they agree. That inertia also hinders consumers from pursuing a
claim if it would require them to hire an attorney, or to file a claim in court or
with an arbitration association. It’s true: we are all pretty lazy. Furthermore,
many of the face-to-face resolution procedures specified in online terms and con‐
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ditions require sophistication and resources that many consumers do not possess.
Most consumers do not have the time, money, or education to deal with legal pro‐
cesses.
Merchants also know that consumers very rarely take complaints to the
courts, federal regulators, or third parties such as a local chamber of commerce or
the Better Business Bureau (‘BBB’). Anger may fuel a consumer’s initial e-mail or
phone call regarding a purchase problem, but consumers generally do not follow
up after receiving no reply or when facing long hold times with customer service
phone lines. Customer service representatives may also lack authority to provide
remedies, or may make it very stressful for consumers to obtain any redress. All
merchants have to do is provide a little procedural complexity and the vast major‐
ity of consumers drop the issue.
2

The Squeaky Wheel System

So who does get redress in the current system? Only those consumers who are
sufficiently motivated to make a lot of noise, or to pursue redress options that
other consumers would dismiss as too time consuming and frustrating. This cre‐
ates the ‘squeaky wheel system’ (SWS) in B2C exchanges. This SWS concept
encompasses the notion that the ‘squeaky wheels’ – those consumers who are
proactive in pursuing their needs and complaints – are most likely to get the
assistance, remedies and other benefits they seek. Meanwhile, those who remain
silent because they lack the knowledge, experience or resources to artfully and
actively pursue their interests usually do not receive the same benefits.
Merchants appease the squeaky wheels in order to prevent negative publicity
and avoid giving remedies to the majority. They also may point to the resolutions
provided to this small number of squeaky wheels as evidence that problems are
being resolved. Resolutions are rationed to the customers who make the most
noise, while consumers with the least time and resources to learn about, under‐
stand or pursue their claims are left without remedies. Merchants use this SWS to
waylay lawsuits and other public complaints, and to keep the majority of consum‐
ers unaware of their potential rights. This also allows merchants to save remedy
costs and keep claims out of the public eye.
Defenders of the theory that the current market structure promotes effi‐
ciency and fairness argue that regardless of whether most consumers bargain for
efficient contract terms or improved company practices, this informed minority
will speak for the uninformed masses. This minority will then pressure companies
to improve their contracts and practices or face the risk of lawsuits and negative
publicity. Studies, however, cast doubt on the existence of this ‘informed minor‐
ity’ – let alone informed (or any) consumers’ propensity to champion the masses.
Complaint systems therefore become skewed in favour of the most experi‐
enced, educated and powerful consumers who know how to artfully submit com‐
plaints and get what they want. These consumers then have little to no incentive
to alert the majority about available remedies, and they become essentially com‐
plicit in the exploitation of the uninformed majority by reaping the benefits of
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remedy rationing. Companies dedicate resources to assist these powerful consum‐
ers while keeping the majority in the dark about their rights and remedies. At the
same time, the interests of this informed minority may not overlap with the
interests, needs or types of claims experienced by the majority.
Merchants may then manipulate the market by appeasing, and thus quieting,
the few sophisticated squeaky wheels who pursue contract changes and remedies
when problems arise. Consumers with higher incomes and more education thus
end up on top in a consumer caste system. The squeaky wheels expect more and
get more from their purchases than those in lower socioeconomic status groups.
One study indicated that “for every 1,000 purchases, households in the highest
status category voice complaints concerning 98.9 purchases, while households in
the lowest status category voice complaints concerning 60.7 purchases.”
3

Social Pressures Not to Pursue Redress

Societal influences and stereotypes also play into the SWS and hinder consumers
from asserting complaints or getting remedies in person. As an initial matter, cul‐
ture teaches individuals not to ‘rock the boat’ or complain. This is especially true
for women, who may be especially reluctant to assert complaints or pursue their
needs due to fear of appearing ‘pushy’. Women also are much less likely than men
to recognize opportunities to negotiate and usually use less assertive language
than men when they do pursue negotiations. Similarly, research shows that black
consumers are less likely than white consumers to realize opportunities to com‐
plain regarding their purchases. In addition, these consumers often do not receive
the same purchase benefits as white consumers regardless of education or
income.
Conscious or subconscious biases may lead business representatives to offer
the least advantageous prices to racial minorities. This coincides with research
indicating that consumers in lower socioeconomic status groups often become
accustomed to poor treatment and have lower expectations regarding the quality
of their purchases and their ability to obtain remedies if problems arise. Consum‐
ers with a lower socioeconomic status also are likely to have less confidence, fewer
resources, lower levels of education and are possibly hindered in asserting them‐
selves due to limited English proficiency. Of course, ‘status’ is an ill-defined term
and no assumptions or studies apply for all consumers. Nonetheless, data suggest
a growing divide between the high-power ‘haves’ and low-power ‘have-nots’ based
on income, education and age.
Furthermore, stereotypes and biases may augment this divide, especially
when individuals interact face-to-face and consciously or subconsciously make
assumptions about the other based on race, gender and age. Customer service
associates’ conscious and subconscious biases may affect how they treat consum‐
ers, and lead them to offer less advantageous deals to racial and ethnic minorities
and women. Consumers also may make assumptions about customer service asso‐
ciates, which may impact their interactions and impede their access to remedies.
Furthermore, consumers may perpetuate their own low-power status by assum‐
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ing that they will be unfairly judged or brushed aside. For example, a woman fear‐
ful that she will appear ‘pushy’ if she seeks assistance may feel constrained in her
communications with customer service representatives. These forces all contrib‐
ute towards consumers receiving different deals and remedies.
4

A Broken System for Consumer Redress

In sum: The SWS, along with behavioural and sociological propensities, leave the
vast majority of consumers without remedies, while merchants cash in by saving
on remedy costs and keeping claims off the public radar of courts and govern‐
ment regulators. This also hinders consumers’ access to information that would
assist them in ‘voting with their feet’ by choosing to avoid or leave companies
that have bad track records with respect to the goods and services they provide.
The SWS also means that the individuals who already enjoy disproportionate
power due to social or economic status usually receive disproportionate benefits.
Of course, there are legitimate arguments against these critiques. For exam‐
ple, some law and economics theorists posit that strict contract enforcement
results in an optimal allocation of resources overall, even if a few consumers lose
out on their claims. They suggest that consumers buy the optimal quality and
quantity of goods and services under competitive terms, and this competition
drives companies to cater their deals to serve consumer preferences. These theo‐
rists also surmise that merchants will strive to provide remedies and appease cus‐
tomers as part of this competitive process.
In reality, however, most consumers do not have perfect information about
the market and do not read or understand their rights, let alone the complicated
terms commonly appearing in form contracts. Consumers therefore fail to pur‐
chase optimal quantities or bargain for competitive and efficient terms. More‐
over, they often fail to realize their rights or the remedies that they deserve. This
arguably leaves market players free to take advantage of consumers’ lack of infor‐
mation and bargaining power. It is therefore unlikely that the market is policing
the fairness or efficiency of consumer contracts.
For example, researchers who studied consumers’ internet browsing behav‐
iour on 66 online software companies’ websites found that only one or two out of
1,000 shoppers actually accessed the companies’ standard form contracts (refer‐
red to as end-user software license agreements, or ‘EULAs’). Furthermore, they
found that shoppers rarely read product reviews or otherwise seek information
about the terms and conditions of their purchases.
Similarly, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of proactive consumers will
regulate merchant practices by spreading information and taking action regard‐
ing purchase problems. One European study found that only 7% of consumer
cases ended with a resolution in court or an alternative proceeding. The research‐
ers also found that 45% of launched complaints ended with no agreement or deci‐
sion, suggesting that consumers who took initial action on their complaints gave
up their pursuit along the way. While some complaints may truly lack merit, the
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study’s findings suggest that perhaps even initially proactive consumers are
unlikely to continue a fight to the benefit of themselves, let alone all consumers.
Furthermore, it is becoming more difficult for consumers to even become
informed about their rights and remedies due to the high costs of obtaining infor‐
mation and pursing contract claims. For example, only 16% of the nearly twothirds of Consumer Reports survey respondents who claimed that they actually
read all of the disclosures regarding a new loan or credit card said that they found
the disclosures easy to understand. In addition, well-meaning policy makers have
advanced disclosure laws aimed to address information asymmetries that often
leave consumers in the dark about their rights. However, these seemingly proconsumer rules often backfire by adding to the information overload that already
clouds consumers’ comprehension of their contract. These disclosure rules also
may increase consumer costs to account for the expense of compliance. Consum‐
ers are simply overwhelmed by lengthy contracts.
Companies also may discourage consumers’ attempts to read purchase terms
by using especially complicated fine print in their contracts and teaser promo‐
tions. For example, lenders may stealthily add credit insurance provisions into
loan documents using confusing language that most consumers do not under‐
stand. It is nearly impossible for even so-called sophisticated consumers to under‐
stand such credit provisions.
Big data has added to this challenge. Data brokers gather a vast amount of
information about consumers and use it to determine how each buyer will be
treated in the marketplace. Such data collection is often benign when consumers
initially give their consent, and it is aimed at helping companies to funnel their
marketing dollars towards attracting consumers who likely seek their goods or
services. However, the data collected can also be used to disadvantage buyers.
Collected data may lead to differential pricing or exemptions from cash back or
layaway purchase options. In this way, big data can increase the information
asymmetry between merchants and consumers.
Most consumers feel powerless when seeking remedies regarding their pur‐
chases. For example, the majority of cellular phone customers feel they must sub‐
mit to price increases and added charges. This is especially true when the con‐
sumer does not have time or resources to research her options and is striving to
retain cellular services in a market dominated by relatively few companies. Con‐
sumers have become acutely aware that oligarchic market conditions such as
those in the cellular service industry give the companies great power in determin‐
ing prices and contract terms. Merchants may therefore capitalize on consumers’
lack of resources and power, knowing that relatively few will seek contract
changes.
5

Class Actions

The most common kind of consumer mass claim in the US is the class action.
When a group of consumers all experience the same problem in interacting with a
business, those buyers join a class, which is represented by lead plaintiffs and one
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lawyer or group of lawyers. Once the class is certified by a judge, the lawyer repre‐
senting the class can approach the business and explain the nature of the class
action and outline an appropriate remedy. The individual claimants generally
have no initial costs. Instead, the lawyers who convene the class cover the costs to
pursue the case, but later take a prescribed percentage of the eventual settlement
or award. This can benefit consumers when they do not have to attend hearings,
pay any costs or invest any time or money in the proceedings. However, these
processes often go on for years, and may not result in perfect or complete redress.
Businesses often face a difficult choice when presented with a class action.
They can bear the costs and negative publicity of fighting the class action in court
or quickly settle to end the action. Businesses fear class actions because they usu‐
ally take years to defend, and cost businesses a great deal in legal fees with no
guarantee of a beneficial outcome. Some of the class actions that have gone to
trial have generated surprisingly costly decisions against the businesses in ques‐
tion. Moreover, the negative publicity alone can close a vulnerable business.
Accordingly, businesses usually settle class actions based on simple cost calcula‐
tions. Maybe legal costs are projected to exceed the value of the payout, or maybe
the bad press generated by the class action will be too onerous for the business to
bear.
Class actions are intended to hold businesses accountable for their behaviour,
and they create financial incentives for businesses to do the right thing by their
customers or face serious financial consequences. For very serious issues (e.g.
drugs that caused serious injuries or death or communities who suffered from
pollution of the water supply caused by secretly dumping chemicals), class actions
may be the best way to get justice. Big payouts may go a long way towards provid‐
ing justice to individuals and families victimized in these ways, and businesses
may be more careful in their future dealings if they know the risk of a class action
exists.
For an online consumer, however, the experience of participating in a class
action is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, many consumers are opted into a
class without being aware that there was ever a problem in the first place. If all
goes right, the consumer can fill out some paperwork, wait for the process to play
out, and get a check they may or may not even deserve.
In the usual scenario, however, the class action process can take years to
resolve and consumers are often left with little redress while lawyers reap high
legal fees. Many consumers have the experience of being opted into a class and
waiting several years to get a tiny reimbursement. As you can see in Figure 1,
Colin received a 1 cent reimbursement check from a class action that was filed
against eBay (Colin’s former employer). The issue targeted by the class action was
a seemingly trivial matter, a slightly higher charge for items within a certain cate‐
gory of the eBay marketplace. Colin did not opt into this class; he was opted in by
the lawyers who filed the case, and who did not require Colin to fill out any paper‐
work. The class action administrators paid 44 cents for a stamp to mail Colin this
1 cent check. Why would anyone bother to file a class action for a 1 cent reim‐
bursement? They wouldn’t. But the lawyers who filed the case ended up making
tens of millions of dollars when eBay decided to settle. There were many millions
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Figure 1

The one cent class action settlement check

of eBay customers in the class these lawyers had certified, and while each individ‐
ual eBay user didn’t make much money, the percentage awarded to the law firms
who pushed the class action was quite substantial.
Amy had a similar experience, where she was opted into a class action against a
cell phone provider and received no real payout. Instead, she merely received a
coupon that would have required her to continue buying from that provider –
while the lawyers gathered legal fees and announced victory. Now there are even
some class actions where the consumers get nothing, but the lawyers still get
their payout. A recent privacy class action was settled with Yahoo where the con‐
sumers in the class who had their privacy violated got no reimbursement, but the
lawyers who filed the case made millions of dollars. Many of the readers of this
article likely have similar stories.
As in any type of court case, there are both justified class actions and unjusti‐
fied class actions. There are definitely examples of abuse, but there are also many
examples of justice being done. The question is, do class actions provide a resolu‐
tion experience that best protects online consumers? We would argue the answer
to that question is no. Buyers want fast and fair resolutions, preferably in
minutes or days, not weeks or months or years. The bulk of the benefits in these
e-commerce class actions go to the lawyers, not the consumers who are ostensibly
the wronged parties. There are so many costs and procedural requirements in the
class action system that the lawyers usually end up getting paid a good bit of the
money that should be going to the consumers directly. The class action process is
too slow and too inefficient to provide consumers the kind of redress they say
they want.
6

The Growth of Binding Arbitration Clauses for Consumers

At the same time, class actions have been essentially shut down in many con‐
sumer contexts in the wake of the arbitration revolution in the US over the past
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20 years. Over that time, the Supreme Court has become increasingly pro-busi‐
ness in enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses in B2C contracts. This really
came to a head in 2013 with the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T v. Concepcion.
That case significantly increased businesses’ power to block class actions by ena‐
bling businesses to include a pre-dispute arbitration clause with a class action
waiver in their consumer contracts. State courts had been using state contract
defences to limit enforcement of these clauses, but the Court in AT&T held that
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) pre-empted the California court from applying
a general contract defence to preclude enforcement of the arbitration clause in
AT&T’s contract with its consumers.
After that decision, there was an immediate wave of General Counsels inte‐
grating Concepcion-style arbitration clauses into their companies’ terms and con‐
ditions. If you check the terms for your bank account, credit card, cell phone or
favorite website, you’re likely to find plenty of examples. Many companies were
delighted to finally have a way to protect themselves from class action exposure
through the use of these clauses. The clauses often direct consumers to submit
their claims to F2F procedures that require an immediate deposit of filing and
administrative fees. This deposit hinders consumers’ incentive to file a claim,
especially when the initial filing and administration costs outweigh any potential
recovery through the procedure. This is true even if consumers may be able to
recoup fees if an award is made in their favour. Moreover, these clauses nearly
always preclude class proceedings of any kind. It does not take much examination
to conclude that the primary focus of these clauses is to block consumers from
joining any kind of class or combined proceeding.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Federal consumer
advocacy organization championed by Elizabeth Warren and now run by Richard
Cordray, was given authority by the Dodd Frank Act to investigate the use of
these arbitration clauses and issue regulations with respect to consumer financial
products and services. Their recently released draft regulation on the subject indi‐
cates that they will move to ban the use of these pre-dispute arbitration clauses
where they would preclude consumers from joining a class action. Based on the
statistics shared by the CFPB, it is clear from the case filing data that most con‐
sumers simply aren’t using these face-to-face arbitration options to get redress.
Hundreds of thousands, and even millions, of consumers obtain some level of
redress, however small, from class actions each year. In contrast, very few con‐
sumers exercise their right to arbitration each year. That volume differential pro‐
vides a stark reason to be concerned about how these arbitration clauses and class
action waivers may be denying consumers effective redress.
Again, it generally makes no economic sense for a consumer to pay hundreds
or thousands of dollars in filing fees and travel costs to assert an individual claim
regarding a modest amount of money. Take the example of a defective cellular
phone that costs $300. It may be worthwhile for a consumer to join a class action
with many other consumers who have faced similar problems with their phones.
This is true even if the consumer only gets $150 in the final settlement after pay‐
ing their attorneys. However, that same consumer would not have that option if
there is a pre-dispute arbitration clause in their contract. The consumer would
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have to act on her own, and pay arbitration filing and administrative fees, in the
hopes of recouping the fees in an eventual award. Most consumers quickly con‐
clude that it is simply not worthwhile to pursue redress through arbitration −
especially taking into account the time and hassles of a F2F proceeding.
It is important to note that the new CFPB regulations will not help that cellu‐
lar phone customer. Cellular phone contracts are not financial products or serv‐
ices, and the CFPB only has the authority to regulate financial institutions. Fur‐
thermore, the CFPB regulations was not finalized at the time of this publication.
Politics and regulatory mechanisms are likely to generate delays that will leave
the regulations in limbo. Nonetheless, the data already released by the CFPB
makes clear that consumers are extremely unlikely to pursue their rights through
the existing F2F arbitration processes. And for many consumers in a post-Concep‐
cion world, those processes are their only available option.
Mandatory arbitration provisions also privatize dispute resolution, which
enable companies to unilaterally design their own legal rules. This enables compa‐
nies to design redress processes that are quite different from what the courts pro‐
vide. For example, most private resolution processes keep the outcomes achieved
by consumers private. This may limit public access to information regarding
faulty products and company improprieties. Without this public knowledge of
these filings and their outcome, it can be difficult to uncover products that should
be recalled and inform the masses about companies’ malfeasance. For example,
Consumer Reports found in a 2010 survey that less than a quarter of the
respondents said they researched product recalls, and only a fifth of the respond‐
ents were aware of recalls regarding products they had purchased in the past 3
years. Furthermore, “an additional 15 percent simply threw the product in the
trash rather than returning it for a refund, an exchange, or a free repair.” Keeping
resolutions confidential stymies regulation of defective products, which may
place consumers at increased risk of harm. Furthermore, it again suggests a need
for expanded and readily accessible remedy systems that lower the hurdles to
obtaining remedies and raise expectations regarding customer care.
7

Limitations on Legal Redress Options for Online Consumers

Even if a consumer does retain their right to pursue legal recourse for a transac‐
tion problem, the legal system can be difficult to utilize. F2F processes of any
kind are often infeasible for many consumers. Individuals lack the time, money,
knowledge and patience to pursue even small claims court proceedings. People
busy with work and family obligations are likely to give up in pursuing complaints
when companies ignore their initial requests for assistance.
In addition, the courts are still very much tied to geography and jurisdiction.
To decide how to resolve a legal case it first must be established which law
applies. The same case can potentially get very different outcomes based on which
law governs the resolution process. These days, however, which law applies is no
longer a simple question to answer. A buyer in Brazil may purchase an item from
a seller in France operating from a marketplace based in the United States, and
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the item may be shipped directly to the buyer from a warehouse in China. Which
law would apply should a problem arise? And if the item is only worth $100, what
lawyer would be willing to take the case to hammer out the complex jurisdictional
questions? Which judge would have the power or aptitude to hear that case?
Even if a consumer does decide to file a case in court, why should the mer‐
chant care if the merchant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court where the
case is filed? If a consumer in Colorado buys an item from a merchant in Berlin
and experiences a problem, why would the German merchant care if the con‐
sumer filed a complaint in a small claims court in Denver? And how is it reasona‐
ble to ask the consumer to retain counsel in Germany to file a case in the mer‐
chant’s home jurisdiction, if the value of the purchase is only a couple of hundred
dollars and the cost of retaining a lawyer is several times that?
Consumer protection authorities face similar challenges. If a citizen reports a
problem with a domestic seller, their local or national consumer protection
agency has the authority to investigate the matter and potentially take enforce‐
ment action against the merchant. But if a citizen reports a problem with an
international seller the consumer protection agency has no legal authority to pur‐
sue the matter. And as citizens increasingly engage in cross-border and interna‐
tional transactions, powered by the reach of new communication technologies,
national and regional consumer protection authorities are continuing to lose
ground in helping to protect their citizens from being taken advantage of. There
are very few systems in place to enable regional and national consumer protection
agencies and advocates to help consumers who have been victimized by mer‐
chants outside of their home geography. This problem will only get worse as ecommerce continues to expand.
8

Crossing the Digital Divide

In the early 2000s, the biggest obstacle to expanding access to justice through
technology was called the ‘digital divide’. The concern was that only rich people
could afford technology and fast internet connections, so that technology-pow‐
ered systems would disproportionally benefit the affluent. Many public invest‐
ments in technology were put off due to this concern. Over the last 15 years, how‐
ever, the dynamics have changed significantly. The introduction of inexpensive
mobile phones have democratized access to the internet. There has been an
increase in the number of individuals and households who have internet access,
but concerns about the digital divide persist based primarily on educational
attainment, age and household income. For example, the Pew Research Center
(PRC) found in its 2013 study of broadband use that approximately 70% of adults
had a high-speed broadband connection to the Internet, while 3% had a home
dial-up connection. Home broadband use was greatest for white, non-Hispanic
(74%) and lowest for Hispanic (53%) consumers.
However, the PRC also found that smartphone usage has created new means
for accessing the Internet, especially for minority groups and those with lower
economic means. For example, 10% of Americans do not have home broadband
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internet access, but they do own a smartphone. Smartphones also virtually elimi‐
nate the digital divide among races and ethnicities, with 80% of ‘White, Non-His‐
panic’, 79% of ‘Black, Non-Hispanic’ and 75% ‘Hispanic’ having some internet
access through home broadband or a smartphone. Still, smartphones widen the
digital divide between 18 and 29 year olds and those over age 65 (increasing from
a gap of 37 percentage points in home broadband access to 49 percentage points
when taking smartphones into account).
There was a time when telephones were also considered to be luxuries, availa‐
ble only to the affluent. Over time, however, telephone access expanded to the
point where public bodies were comfortable providing services via the telephone.
It appears that internet access is at a similar tipping point. Policy makers and
agencies now see the value of utilizing technology to deliver services more effi‐
ciently and effectively, and many now believe technology will help them get
access to underprivileged populations. A phone manufacturer in India recently
announced it was selling a smartphone for $7, and the government has begun giv‐
ing out free tablets to school children. It appears that the price point for these
technologies has fallen to a point where it is reasonable to presume near-ubiquity
in terms of internet access, presuming all services are also optimized to be deliv‐
ered through a mobile device in addition to a web- or computer-based experience.
9

Credit Card Chargebacks

Some consumer advocates have argued that the best model currently available for
protecting consumers is the credit card chargeback process. Under that process,
consumers can contact their credit card issuer to reverse charges in transactions
where the consumer was dissatisfied, even if the merchant disagrees. The charge‐
back system was originally put in place at the request of public consumer advo‐
cates and Attorneys General, and it does go a long way towards empowering con‐
sumers and creating a more level playing field.
However, the chargeback process is not essentially a resolution process. The
chargeback system does not enable a conversation between the buyer and the
seller to work out a transaction problem. The buyer participates in the process
through their card issuer and the seller through their merchant services provider,
making collaboration extremely difficult. If the buyer files a chargeback, the mer‐
chant is charged a fee and the payment is immediately reversed from the mer‐
chant’s account back to the consumer’s account. Merchants must often keep a
deposit on file to fund these immediate reversals. If the merchant disagrees with
the chargeback, they can ‘re-present’ the charge, and the money is reversed again.
Each reversal involves an additional fee. Eventually, if the parties are determined
enough, the case can be escalated to an arbitration administered by the card net‐
work. But the cost of that arbitration can be prohibitive, and only a tiny volume
of cases ever get escalated to that level. Many merchants just give up when they
receive a chargeback, because the chances of successful reversal are so low and the
effort required so high.
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As a result, the chargeback system is less a resolution process and more of a
liability shift. The system is not designed to resolve disputes via mutual agree‐
ment. Most merchants hate the chargeback system, because they feel it gives too
much power to the buyers, but because credit cards are so ubiquitous they have
no choice but to accept credit card payments. Also, the credit card networks make
money from the fees charged upon every reversal, and they also make money
from the high interest rates charged to consumers who don’t pay off their full bal‐
ance every month. It is somewhat ironic for consumer advocates to support a
redress process funded largely by onerous interest payments carried by consum‐
ers who may have gotten underwater with the debt carried on their credit cards.
Chargebacks are also not a universal right. In Canada and North America the
chargeback process is very generous, with consumers able to file chargebacks for
all kinds of issues, including non-receipt and item quality disputes, but in other
regions chargebacks are only allowed in cases of fraud or identity theft. Consum‐
ers are often unaware of their credit card chargeback rights, which means filing
volumes are very low. Because of the cost associated with credit card payments,
many merchants are trying to shift their payments onto debit or ACH networks,
which have no chargeback rights other than fraud and unauthorized payment
reversals. Some geographies rely heavily on bank transfers or stored value wallets,
which also have inconsistent reversal rights. So while we can learn quite a bit
from the chargeback system, it is not a realistically viable solution for consumer
redress around the world.
10 Envisioning a New Process
All of these challenges in trying to provide effective redress to consumers have
created momentum behind an effort to change the way we think about consumer
protection. The old zero-sum debate between consumer advocates (presumed to
be in collaboration with the class action bar) and the big legal defence firms (pre‐
sumed to be doing the bidding of big corporations) has achieved little in terms of
progress over the past few decades. Each side has continued to point fingers, with
businesses supposedly abusing customers and class action attorneys supposedly
filing frivolous cases to force settlement. The debate over pre-dispute binding
arbitration clauses is only the latest phase in this ongoing back and forth.
But the internet has continued to change the game even while the zero-sum
debate was playing out in the courts and legislatures. In fact, while few were pay‐
ing attention, some of the promising dynamics that had been identified by the
internet futurists like Doc Searls in the 1990s have begun to pan out. Consumers
are getting more skilled at using the internet to organize, and the wide spectrum
of choice is moving towards more trustworthy merchants and marketplaces.
While the regulators and lawyers were debating minimum standards and binding
arbitration clauses, leading e-commerce businesses were going far beyond legal
requirements for consumer protection. Forward-thinking merchants are creating
the next generation systems that could handle consumer problems. Entirely new
types of companies, sometimes called ‘sharing economy’ or ‘collaborative’ compa‐
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nies, were being started by consumers for others consumers. They were bringing
a wholly new attitude to consumer protection.
Large internet intermediaries, like online marketplaces (eBay), large mer‐
chants (Amazon) and payment processors (Paypal), realized very early on that the
consumer trust problem was creating friction on the internet and that solving it
could provide a valuable market advantage. These companies weren’t willing to
wait for regulators to figure out how to provide consumer protection on the inter‐
net, so they moved to build their own solutions to address the problem. For these
large internet companies, trust in transactions proved to be a powerful competi‐
tive differentiator, one with a demonstrably positive impact on the bottom line.
Many forward-thinking consumer protection organizations began to recog‐
nize this trend as well. They saw that these new internet platforms were creating
next-generation redress systems that were delivering fast and fair resolutions to
consumers, all within the private sector. Instead of falling back into the old finger
pointing between business and consumer advocates, there emerged a new zone of
cooperation that offered some reason for optimism. The 2003 agreement
between Consumers International and the Global Business Dialogue on e-com‐
merce (GBDe) was an important step in this direction. Suddenly two groups that
had long been tugging on either end of the rope and getting nowhere were finding
ways they could now both pull on the same side, working together in common
purpose.
Regulators as well had come to the conclusion that court-based approaches to
consumer protection were destined to fail in an internet-powered economy.
Long-standing efforts to resolve jurisdictional questions around consumer dis‐
putes, like the Hague Conference on Private International Law, were not getting
any closer to agreement despite decades of negotiation. A proposition to legally
locate all consumer disputes in the home jurisdiction of the consumer was pre‐
sented by the Canadian and Brazilian delegations to the Organization of Ameri‐
can States (OAS) in 2009, but the concept was met with quite a bit of resistance.
How could internet merchants defend themselves in every jurisdiction around
the world? The concept seemed out of step with where the economy was going.
In response to the Brazilian and Canadian proposal, the US State Department
offered a blueprint for the use of ODR to build a global, cross-border system for
resolving consumer disputes. The proposal was met with such enthusiasm that
UNCITRAL decided to devote a Working Group to the concept, Working Group
III, which has met bi-annually in Vienna and New York for the last 6 years to flesh
it out in more detail. Similarly, the European Parliament passed a regulation
requiring all member states to implement cross-border consumer ODR by the
middle of 2016. The European Standards organization, the International Stan‐
dards Organization and the Canadian legislature all quietly issued standards for
quality ODR. It was clear that a consensus was building up.
In fact, the OECD’s Committee on Consumer Policy recently released a draft
recommendation from the Council of Consumer Protection in eCommerce that
reads, in part:
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Consumers should have access to ADR mechanisms, including online dispute
resolution systems, to facilitate the resolution of claims over e-commerce
transactions, with special attention to low value or cross-border transactions.
Although such mechanisms may be financially supported in a variety of ways,
they should be designed to provide dispute resolution on an objective, impar‐
tial, and consistent basis, with individual outcomes independent of influence
by those providing financial or other support. (Art. 45)
The OECD document goes on to state that “The development by businesses of
internal complaints handling mechanisms, which enable consumers to informally
resolve their complaints directly with businesses, at the earliest possible stage,
without charge, should be encouraged.” For an organization focused on consumer
protection to be specifically calling on merchants to build their own private reso‐
lution processes is a big breakthrough, and an indicator of how universal these
sentiments have become.
The Civil Justice Council in the United Kingdom recently conducted an exten‐
ded study of ODR in civil cases, eventually recommending that the Ministry of
Justice create something called ‘Her Majesty’s Online Court’, which could resolve
all cases under £25,000 through ODR mechanisms. As the Master of the Rolls
said in the Forward to the final report, “ODR will play an important role in the
future of civil justice.” Similar conclusions are being reached by judicial luminaries
around the world. After much study and inquiry, they are concluding that we can‐
not update our old legal redress systems fast enough to keep up with the changes
being wrought by the internet. We need to build for the future. Software-enabled
private resolution processes, backed by private enforcement, are seen by many
judges and regulators as a much better fit with the needs of online consumers
than legal redress options.
11 Call For Action
UNCITRAL’s ODR Working Group has now wrapped up. Although its participants
have not been able to craft a final set of procedural rules for ODR that all the
member delegations could ratify, there was an overwhelming sense that actors
from around the globe seek to ultimately create an ODR process for consumers
worldwide. Indeed, the EU has launched their own ODR platform in the first half
of 2016 alongside a regulation that requires all online merchants in the EU to
inform their customers of the availability of ODR. The EU ODR platform also pro‐
vides a link to the ODR filing form, which is being set up by the EU itself. How‐
ever, the EU system only governs consumers and merchants within the EU, so
consumers outside of the EU do not have an equivalent system should they
encounter a problem. These actions, and the emerging consensus behind them,
are opening a window of opportunity. Now is the time to build the next genera‐
tion of consumer protection, undergirded by the tools of ODR.
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